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Cardiff: Conflict in the California Coastal Act: Sand and Seawalls

CONFLICT IN THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT:
SAND AND SEAWALLS
Todd T. Cardiff
I. INTRODUCTION
"Seawalls damnage virtually every beach they are built on. If they are built
on eroding beaches-and they are rarely built anywhere else-they eventually destroy [the beach]."

Coastal landowners in California are building seawalls at an alarming
rate.2 Currently, shoreline armoring occupies between 130 and 150 miles of
California's 1,100-mile coastline.' Unfortunately, seawalls have a disastrous
effect on the public beach.' On an eroding beach, seawalls will eventually
* J.D. Candidate, April 2002, California Western School of Law; B.A., 1995 California
Polytechnic State University at San Luis Obispo; Executive Committee Member, San Diego
Chapter of the Surfrider Foundation; Executive Editor, California Western International Law
Journal.
1. CORNELIA DEAN, AGAINST THE TIDE, THE BATTLE FOR AmRicA's BEAcniES 53 (1999).
Cornelia Dean is the science editor for the New York Times.
2. In the last two years seawalls have been permitted to protect fifteen properties in Solana Beach, CA. See, e.g., Cal. Coastal Comm'n Application No. 6-99-103 (shoreline armoring permit protecting seven properties, approved Oct. 14, 1999); Application No. 6-99-56
(shoreline armoring permit protecting three properties, approved May 12. 1999); Application
No. 6-99-91 (approved Jan. 12, 2000); Application No. 6-00-66 (shoreline protection permit
protecting two properties, approved Oct. 10, 2000); Application No. 6-00-36 (shoreline armoring protecting two properties, approved March 13, 2001); and Application No. 6-00-138
(shoreline armoring protecting two properties, approved Mar. 13, 2001). See also pleadings
at I Calbeach Advocates v. City of Solana Beach, Case No. GIN010294, (filed Jan. 25, 2001
San Diego Superior Court) (on file with author).
3. "Shoreline armoring" is a generic term for any hardened structure used to protect
against wave action, such as seawalls, revetments, rip-rap, and bulkheads. In this Comment
the terms "seawalls" and "shoreline armoring" will be used interchangeably.
4. See Su1rRiDER FOUNDATION: STATE OF THE BEACtH 10 (2000) (noting that 1990 statistics showed 130 miles of seawalls in California and that California has experienced two El
Niflos in the 1990s). See also Gary B. Griggs, Bringing Back the Beaches-A Return to Basics, available at http://www.wetsand.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2000) (noting that approximately 14% of California is armored).
5. See generally DEAN, supra note 1; ORRtN H. PtLKEY & KATIARLNt L. Dixo., THLCORPS AND THE SHORE (1996); WALLACE KAUFMAN & ORRIN PILKEY, TilE BEACHtES ARE
MOVING, THE DROWNING OF AMERICA'S SHORELINE (1979) (explaining the adverse impacts of

seawalls).
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destroy the beach, leaving no dry sand area for recreation. 6 Furthermore,
beach replenishment projects, the primary method for restoring beaches destroyed by seawalls, are extremely expensive and increase the width of the
recreational beach for only a very short time.7
Beaches are vital to California's economy, generating fourteen billion
tourism dollars per year.' From a purely economic viewpoint, California's
beaches are considerably more important to the overall economy than the
property that shoreline armoring is designed to protect. Shoreline armoring
only benefits the incredibly small minority of the population that owns property directly on the coast, while it decreases access to the millions of people
who flock to the beach every year.9
Coastal property owners claim they have both constitutional and statutory rights to protect their property with shoreline armoring. 0 Under the current interpretation of the Coastal Act," Coastal landowners are permitted to
build a seawall if their primary structure is endangered by erosion. However,
as this Comment will demonstrate, it was never the Legislature's intent to
protect structures built after 1976.
In 1976, when the California legislature passed the Coastal Act, the legislature was aware of the adverse impacts of seawalls." California Coastal
Act section 30253 mandates that:
New development shall ...[a]ssure stability and structural integrity, and
neither create nor contribute significantly to erosion, geologic instability,
or destruction of the site or surrounding area or in any way require the
that would substantially alter natural
construction of protective devices
landforms along bluffs and cliffs.' 3

6. Nicholas C. Kraus, The Effects of Seawalls on the Beach: An Extended LiteratureReview, Special Issue, J. COASTAL RES., 1, 4 (1988) (However, Kraus disputes whether active
erosion is supported by scientific evidence.).
7.

See SAN DIEGO REGIONAL BEACH SAND PROJECT FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL

IMPACT

REPORT/ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, State Clearinghouse No. 1999041104 (2000) (The
sand replenishment project will add two million cubic yards of sand to San Diego's beaches at
a cost of fourteen million dollars. The sand is expected to last one to five years.).
8. Philip King, Erecutive Summary of 1999 Report on: The Fiscal Impact of Beaches, at
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/-pgkingbeaches (last visited Nov. 18, 1999) (report prepared for the
California Department of Boating and Waterways).
9. For an excellent documentary film see the video by Eden Productions, LIVING ON "I
EDGE (1998) (available from the Surfrider Foundation at http://www.surfrider.org, 122 S. El
Camino Real, #67, San Clemente, CA 92672).
10. See Whaler's Village Club v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 252
(1985) (landowners arguing they have a vested right to protect property).
11. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30000 et. seq. (2001) [hereinafter Coastal Act § 30000 et.
seq.].
12. See CALIFORNIA COASTAL PLAN 89 (1975). The California Coastal Plan was prepared
prior to the coastal act pursuant to Proposition 20 (1972). See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27320.
13. Coastal Act § 30253 (2001) (emphasis added).
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New development must have sufficient setback from the edge of a bluff
or high tide line so that a seawall is not needed in the future. Unfortunately,
coastal landowners continue to build too close to the shoreline," often intentionally subverting the Coastal Act in exchange for a better view or an increase in the floor area of their coastal home." As the shoreline erodes to
within ten or fifteen feet of the house, the coastal homeowner then argues
that the Coastal Act guarantees shoreline protection because their home is in
imminent danger of destruction from shoreline erosion."
Coastal Act section 30235 states:
Revetments, breakwaters, groins, harbor channels, seawalls, cliff retaining
walls and other shoreline construction that alters natural shoreline processes shall be permitted to protect existing structures.., in danger from
erosion when desigped to minimize or mitigate adverse impacts to shoreline sand supply...
As Coastal Act section 30235 is cuirently interpreted, there is a policy
conflict between the requirement that all new development have sufficient
setback so that shoreline armoring is unnecessary in the future and the policy
of protecting existing structures in danger from erosion. The ultimate question in resolving this conflict is: What is the definition of "existing structure"?
This Comment explores the policies and the current conflict with shoreline armoring in California. It begins with a discussion of shoreline processes, explaining the destructive force of shoreline armoring. Next, the conflict between Coastal Act sections 30253 and 30235 is more fully explored,
with an eye towards understanding the legislative history and the intent of
the legislature. The coastal property owners' claim that building a seawall is
a constitutional right is examined by investigating current case law, both
within and outside of California. Finally, three options to resolve this conflict are presented: legislative, administrative, and judicial.

14. See Gary Griggs & Lauret Savoy, Building or Buying on the Coast. in LIvING WMi!
TH CALIFORNIA COAST 35, 35 (Gary Griggs & Lauret Savoy eds., 1985).
15. Setbacks from streets and other property lines are fixed. In many areas though. the
setback from the bluff's edge is determined by 75-year erosion rates. California Coastal
Commission, Periodic Review of the San Luis Obispo County Certified Local Coastal Program, at 269-70 (Prelim. Rep., Feb. 2, 2001), available at http://www.coastal.ca.gov/web/recap/rctop.html. By declaring an overly optimistic erosion rate of two to three inches a year. a
coastal landowner may build as close as twenty-five feet from the bluff edge. Id. at 271. This
not only provides a great view, but also allows for an increase in square footage of the house.
See also, Staff Report, Cal. Coastal Comm'n Amendment Application No 4-83-490-A2. 24 n.
25 (approved Nov. 14, 2001) (noting that the bluff setback was based on an estimated three
inches per year erosion rate, but geologists subsequently estimated a buff retreat rate of fortyeight inches per year).
16. See Coastal Act § 30235 (2001).
17. Id. (emphasis added).
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II. SHORELINE PROCESS AND SEAWALLS

Shoreline armoring destroys the beach in three main ways: occupation
loss, passive erosion, and active erosion.'8 Occupation loss is simply the area
of the public beach that is physically occupied by the seawall. 9 Passive erosion is the narrowing of the beach in front of a seawall because seawalls fix
in place the back end of the beach, preventing the retreat of the bluff or
shoreline, while the lower beach continues to erode."0 Active erosion is sand
loss caused by waves rebounding off of the seawalls themselves and scouring away the sand.2'
The first step in understanding the damaging nature of seawalls is to Linderstand fundamental beach processes. Beaches in California are created
from sediment transported to the ocean by rivers, streams, and eroding
bluffs.22 Once the sand reaches the coastline, the sand is transported along
the coast by side-shore currents, also called the long-shore currents or littoral
drift. 3 Beaches are sometimes characterized as rivers of sand because of this
constant movement." Unfortunately, this river of sand is often cut-off at its
source by dams, development, flood control projects, and seawalls; and once
the sediment does reach the beach, it is often held up by harbors, jetties and
groins. 5
The recreational area of the beach, also called the dry sand area, 6 makes
up only a small portion of the total sand at a beach.27 Ninety percent of the
18. Orrin H. Pilkey & Howard L. Wright III, Seawalls Versus Beaches, Special Issue 4.
J. COASTAL RES., 41, 43 (1988). See also Video, Living on the Edge (Eden Productions. 1998)
(available from the Surfrider Foundation) (Gary Griggs and Scott Jenkins explaining the effects of shoreline armoring).
19. Pilkey & Wright, supra note 18, at 43 (asserting that a seawall located on a public
beach will naturally prevent use of the beach that it is physically occupying).
20. DEAN, supra note I, at 53; PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 5, at 40. See also Gary B.
Griggs, Bringing Back the Beaches-A Return to Basics, available at
http://www.wetsand.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2000).
21. See DEAN, supra note 1, at 53-55; KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 5, at 208; and
Griggs et al., Understanding the Shoreline, in LIVING WITH THE CALIFORNIA COAST 7. 22
(Gary Griggs & Lauret Savoy eds., 1985) (noting that seawalls block sand supply and cause
erosion from wave rebound).
22. Griggs et al., supra note 21, at 14. Griggs also notes that in Southern California some
beaches are created and maintained by the dredging of harbors. Id. at 21-22.
23. See KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 5, at 81. Technically, littoral drift is the actual
movement of the sand, whereas long shore currents are the side shore currents that cause the
littoral drift. Griggs et al., supra note 21, at 11.
24. See PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 5, at 29; Griggs et al., supra note 21, at 15.
25. Katharine E. Stone, Sand Rights: A Legal System to Protect the "Shores of the Sea.
STETSON L. REV. 709, 711-12 (2000).
26. See, e.g., Coastal Act § 30211 (2001) ("Development shall not interfere with the public's right of access . . . including the use of dry sand and rocky coastal beaches to the first
line of vegetation").
27. See PILKEY & DIXON, supra note 5, at 91 (showing a comparison of a sand replenishment to size of shoreface and zone of active sand movement (underwater sand)).
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beach is underwater." A beach with an inadequate supply of sand input may
experience increased coastal erosion (the shoreline will move back), but the
width of the beach, in the long run, will not change.' However, if the back
part of the beach is fixed by a seawall, the shoreline cannot move back. The
sandy beach will continue to erode, and eventually the dry sand area of the
beach will disappear?0 In some cases, seawalls will artificially increase the
slope of the beach profile." The importance of this concept cannot be overstated, because it is crucial to an understanding of a number of different
cause-and-effect relationships in coastal processes. 2 For example, people are
often struck by how temporary the benefits of beach replenishment are." The
increases in the beach width may last only one season.' A sand-starved
beach has a steep profile. When sand is added to the upper beach, the beach
simply adjusts, seeking equilibrium and the beach profile is temporarily flattened.
On a natural beach, the sand will act as a shock absorber protecting the
shoreline from wave energy. 6 High-energy waves will take a portion of the
dry sand area and coastal bluff and redistribute it underwater to form sand
bars." These sand bars will cause substantial wave energy to disperse before
it reaches the shoreline." In many areas of California, a steep narrow beach
will be backed by a cliff, which will be subjected to intense wave energy."

28. See KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 5, at 89; DEAN, supra note 1, at 158; Griggs et
al., supra note 21, at 11.
29. Aram V. Terchunian, Permitting Coastal Armoring Structures: Can Seawalls and
Beaches Coexist?, Special Issue 4, J. COASTAL RES. 65, 67-68 (1988).
30. PLKEY & DIXON, supra note 5, at 40; Kraus, supra note 6, at 4.
31. Pilkey & Wright, supra note 18, at 59. Contra Kraus, supra note 6. at 4 (finding no
increase in beach slope in front of seawalls, compared to "unstabilized" beaches); and Gary
B. Griggs & James F. Tait, The Effects of Coastal Protection Structures on Beaches Along
Northern Monterey Bay, California, Seawalls Versus Beaches, Special Issue 4, J. COASTAL
RES. 93, 102 (1988) (noting that beach profile in front of seawalls did not change). Griggs,
however, notes that seawalls may cause "wave wash or reflection that actually removes sand
from the beach in front of a seawall." Griggs et al., supra note 21. at 22. A current study by
Scott Jenkins, an oceanographer at Scripps Institute of Oceanography has found significant
increase in the slope of the beach profile in front of seawalls compared to beaches in front of
unprotected cliffs in Solana Beach and Del Mar, CA. (Data on file with author).
32. See DEAN, supranote 1, at 27.
33. See id. at 96; KAUFMAN & PtuKEY, supra note 5, at 216.
34. SAN

DIEGO

REGIONAL

BEACH

SAND

PROJECT

EN\vIRONME.'N'TAL

IMPACT

State Clearinghouse No. 1999041104. 4.1-5 (2000).
35. See DEAN, supra note I, at 96; KAUFMAN & PILKEY, supra note 5, at 216. For diagrams of wave and beach profile dynamics see KAUFMAN & PILKEY (illustration at 206-07);
Griggs et al., supra note 21, at 8.
36. Griggs et al., supranote 21, at 13.
37. Id at 8.
38. Id. Naturally coastal erosion increases during storm events coupled with extreme
high tides. Id at 22.
39. See id.
REPORT/ENvIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT,

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2001

5

California Western Law Review, Vol. 38 [2001], No. 1, Art. 7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

Eventually, the cliff will fail, adding more sand to the system and again flattening the beach profile.'
On a sand-starved beach backed by seawalls, however, waves break
closer to shore and wave energy against the bluff or seawall increases." The
land behind the seawall will not erode (which is the purpose of a seawall),
yet the shoreline will continue to retreat adjacent to the wall. Studies have
shown that the rate of erosion to the shoreline adjacent to a seawall will actually increase due to wave reflection and increased wave energy surrounding a seawall. 2 This has led preeminent coastal geologists to note that once
shoreline armoring begins, it seldom stops, because neighboring properties
will soon build a seawall to protect their property as well. 3 Furthermore, the
increased wave energy rebounding off of seawalls will exacerbate sand loss
on an already depleted beach."
In California, the wallification of the coast is reaching epic proportions. 5 In 1990, seawalls armored over 130 miles of shoreline, approximately 12% of California's 1,100-mile shoreline,46 and the wallification of
the coast has increased in the last decade. 7 It is estimated that 25% of the
total sand supply is contributed by bluff erosion.48 Even accepting this estimate, armoring 12% of the coast creates a significant cumulative effect on
the volume of sand placed into the coastal system.

40. Id.; Nat. Res. Council, MANAGING COASTAL EROSION 24 (1990). Griggs estimates
that bluff erosion does not contribute more than 25% of the beach sand. Griggs et al., supra
note 21, at 15.
41. Terchunian, supra note 29, at 67.
42. Griggs & Tait, supra note 31, at 101-02.
43. Pilkey & Dixon, supra note 5, at 51-53 (noting ten truths about shoreline armoring.
(1) Destroys beaches, is ugly and blocks access; (2) There is no need for armoring unless
someone builds too close to the shoreline; (3) Small number of people create the need: (4)
Once you start you cannot stop; (5) It costs more to save the property than it is worth: (6)
Shoreline armoring begets more shoreline armoring; (7) Shoreline armoring grows bigger: (8)
Shoreline armoring is a politically difficult issue because of its long-term impacts; (9) Shoreline armoring is a politically difficult issue because no compromise is possible; (10) You can
have buildings or you can have beaches; you cannot have both).
44. Active erosion, beach erosion caused by wave rebound, is still highly controversial in
the scientific community. See generally Krause, supra note 5, at I (disputing whether beach
profile increased because of seawalls). Griggs & Tait, supra note 31, at 93 (study noting i
nothern Monterey, where seasonal beach profile rebounded as quickley with a seawall). See
also Pilkey & Wright, supra note 18, at 59 (explaining the academic debate between active
erosion and passive erosion).
45. See Video: Eden Productions, LIVING ON THE EDGE (1998) (Mark Massara. Esq.
Coastal Director of the Sierra Club, coining the word "wallification").
46. SURFRIDER FOUNDATION, STATE OF THE BEACH 10 (2000) (noting that in 1990 there
was 130 miles of shoreline armoring in California).
47. Statistics on shoreline armoring for 1990-1999 are not yet available. It is a reasonable
assumption that at least 20 miles of additional shoreline armoring were constructed in the last
decade.
48. Griggs et al., supranote 21, at 15.
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The ultimate impact of the current shoreline-armoring trend is the loss
of the public beach. According to State and Federal law, the beach below the
mean high-tide line is owned by the State and held in trust for the people.'
In many areas of California, the public owns the dry sand area of the beach,
but even in areas where dry sand area is privately owned, the public has the
right to use the beach for access to the public land.' If halting the natural retreat of the coastline narrows the recreational beach and harms public property, 5' should California allow property owners to protect their property at
the expense of public property? Should nuisance law prevent the cumulative
destruction of public property? Does it make economic sense to favor the
protection of private property when public beaches are the most popular
tourist destination in the United States,' considering the expense of sand replenishment?'
III. HISTORY OF THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT
A. Legislative Intent

In the late 1960s and early 1970s Californians became increasingly
aware of the need for a comprehensive plan to conserve and preserve the
State's 1,100-mile coastline. ' In 1970, less than one quarter of California's
coast was legally accessible to the public," and coastal land was being subjected to a tremendous amount of public and private development at the expense of long-term conservation. 6 Development interests controlled the majority of California's city and county planning commissions." It was evident
49. Lechuza Villas West v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 60 Cal. App. 4th 218, 235 (1997)
("The State owns all tidelands below the ordinary high water mark, and holds such lands in
trust for the public") (citations omitted).
50. Coastal Act § 30211 (2001).
51. KAUFMAN & PaLEY, supra note 5, at 89.
52. James R. Houston, InternationalTourism and U.S. Beaches, SHORE AND BEACI, Apr.
1996, at 3. See also, Fun at the Sea: Coastal Tourism, Recreation, SEA TEim., Oct. 1998, at 3
(noting that 90% of all tourist dollars are spent in Coastal States and 180 million people visit
the coast each year).
53. See Terry Rodgers, Deficit May Reduce Beach Sand Project, SAN DIEGO UNIONTam., Feb. 24, 2001, at B5 (noting that San Diego's Association of Governments Sand Replenishment Project will cost over $17 million).
54. See also Janet Adams, Proposition20-A Citizen's Campaign. 24 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1019 (1973) (describing the background of the bill that created the coastal act). See also generally STANLEY SCOTT, GOVERNING CALIFORNIA'S COAST (1975).
55. See Scorr, supra note 54, at 6 (noting that only 260 miles of coast was accessible to
the public).
56. Id. at 7.
57. See id. at 119-24. "California Legislature's Joint Committee on Open Space Land
found that 52.9% of city planning commission... land] 62.3 percent of county planning
commission members were persons who represented direct or indirect 'beneficial interests."'
Id at 120. "The most corruptive force in government has to do with the use and development
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that the power to make coastal development decisions needed to be removed
from local jurisdictions and vested in a statewide agency." Local control of
coastal development decisions, in essence, amounted to uncontrolled development.
Reacting to concerns by environmentalists and the impending Federal
Coastal Zone Management Act, 9 the California Legislature introduced six
coastal act bills from 1970 to 1971, none of which passed into law.' In 1972,
frustrated by the inability of the Legislature to pass a strong coastal act bill,
conservationists successfully mounted a petition drive to get a coastal initiative on the ballot.6 Proposition 20, the California Coastal Zone Conservation
Act of 1972,62 passed with over 55% of the vote despite well-funded opposition."
Proposition 20 created one state-level and six regional coastal commission boards to review all coastal development permits. In addition, the
coastal commissions were to submit a detailed coastal development plan to
the Legislature by December 1, 1975. Most of the policies and suggested
language in the California Coastal Plan was adopted as the California
Coastal Act of 1976.64
B. The Legislative Record
The legislative record supports the proposition that Coastal Act section
30235 was, in fact, simply a grandfather clause, intended to protect only
structures existing before 1976. The legislative record displays this in three
main ways. First, the Coastal Act was written by environmentalists and opposed by industry. The intent of the bill can be gleaned from reading the
1975 Coastal Plan from this context. Second, an analysis of the textual evolution of the bill in the legislative record supports the "grandfather clause"
of land. The developers and the building industry have been extremely destructive in California... local government [has] been corrupted by these developers." Id. at 121 (quoting Richard Graves, former executive director of the League of California Cities).
58. See Adams, supra note 54, at 1023 (recounting why conservationists became frustrated with local government and eventually viewed local government as the enemy); Scorl.
supra note 54, at 7-8, ("until Proposition 20 passed, the coast was under the fragmented management of 15 counties, 45 cities, 42 state unites and 70 federal agencies (1972 figures)").
59. Scorr, supra note 54, at 11-12.
60. Id. at 14.
61. Adams, supra note 54, at 1032; Scorr, supra note 54, at 353-54. The Coastal Alliance and coalition of various environmental groups spearheaded the Proposition 20 initiative
drive after legislative efforts to pass a strong coastal bill failed in 1971. Id.
62. CAL. Pu. REs. CODE §§ 27000-27650 (1972) repealedby Coastal Act of 1976.
63. ScoTr, supra note 54, at 357. Opposition included Bechtel Corp., General Electric

Co., Southern California Edison Co., Standard Oil Co. of California, Mobil Oil Corp., Gulf
Oil Corp., Occidental Petrol Co., Texaco Inc., Irvine Company (developer), Southern Pacific
Land Company, Teamsters and the California Real Estate Association (partial list).

64. See Coastal Act § 30002 (2001).
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C. Legislative Intent as Determined by the 1975 CaliforniaCoastal Plan
The California Coastal Plan of 1975 (Coastal Plan), mandated by Proposition 20, became the primary basis for SB 1277 (Smith-Beilenson), which
was eventually adopted as the Coastal Act of 1976."' The importance of the
Coastal Plan is explicitly recognized in Coastal Act section 30002(a), which
states, "The California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission... has prepared a plan for the orderly, long-range conservation, use and management
of the natural, scenic, cultural, recreational, and man-made resources of the
coastal zone." Coastal Act section 30002(b) states, "Such plan contains a series of recommendations which require implementation by the Legislature
and that some of those recommendations are appropriate for immediate implementation as provided for in this division while others require additional
review." It is evident from the language, however, which recommendations
contained in the 1975 Coastal Plan required additional legislation for future
implementation and which recommendations were codified within the Act."
By comparing the language of the Plan with that of the Coastal Act, it is
clear that the Plan with regard to bluff setbacks and shoreline protection was
codified.
The California Coastal Plan also sheds light on what the Commissioners
and Legislature considered important in 1976. The first indication of concern
about seawalls appears in the "Major Findings" section of the Plan. The purpose of the Plan is evident from its title: Protect Against Harmful Effects of
Seawalls, Breakwaters, and Other Shoreline Structures. It states: "Seawalls,
breakwaters, groins, and other structures near the shoreline can detract from
the scenic appearance of the oceanfront and can affect the supply of beach
sand."76 The Plan limits the construction of shoreline structures to those necessary to protect existing buildings and public facilities and for beach protection and restoration. Special design considerations were proposed to ensure
continued sand supply to beaches, to provide for public access, and to minimize the visual impact of the structures."
This language (as well as other language encompassed in Policy 19 of
the Coastal Plan ) is very similar to the language encompassed in section
30235. Policy 19 states:

lute.... Zoning laws have been upheld by the courts since 1926). See Coastal Act § 300075
(2001) ("in carrying out the [Coastal Act] ... conflicts [shall] be resolved in a manner which
on balance is the most protective of significant coastal resources.").

74. Coastal Act § 30002 (2001).
75. See, e.g., California Coastal Plan 84 (1975) (Policy 68) ("[l]t is recommended that
State legislation be enacted to assure that, if for any reason new structures... are built in high
geologic hazard areas... there shall be no public assistance for such construction or
reconstruction." (emphasis added)).
76. ld. at 18.
77. 1l at 45.
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contention, because "existing" was intentionally inserted into the final version of the bill. Finally, a comparison of the language of the Coastal Act to
the competing coastal act bills, which were not passed into law, demonstrates a fundamentally different approach to shoreline armoring. A thorough
analysis of the legislative record leaves little doubt that Coastal Act section
30235 intended to protect only those structures existing at the time of the
passage of the Coastal Act.
The Coastal Alliance consisted of a coalition of environmental groups
specifically formed to push for comprehensive legislation for the preservation of the California coast.' Unfortunately, legislative efforts to pass comprehensive coastal conservation bills were repeatedly killed off in committee
by special interest groups." In 1972, frustrated by the lack of success in the
legislature, the Coastal Alliance took a strong coastal bill that had died in
committee, stripped it of its "compromise" amendments, and presented the
bill to the public as Proposition 20.67 The Coastal Act was a bill written by
environmentalists, not developers or legislative representatives. 8
Proposition 20, the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972,
created one state-level Coastal Commission and six regional Coastal Commissions, which were to oversee development and planning until a comprehensive Coastal Act could be enacted.' Additionally, the Coastal Commissions were to "[p]repare a comprehensive, coordinated, enforceable [coastal
development] plan for the orderly, long-range conservation and management
of the natural resources of the coastal zone,"7 and "on or before December 1,
1975.... submit [the plan] to the legislature for its adoption and implementation."'" Many of the recommendations and findings included in the 1975
California Coastal Plan were implemented into the California Coastal Act,
primarily because the coastal act bill, SB 1277 (Smith-Beilenson), supported
by conservationists, was enacted over competing developer-friendly bills.7
The policies and recommendations of the Coastal Plan and, subsequently,
SB 1277 (Coastal Act) were intended to protect natural resources over development.73
65. See Adams, supra note 54, at 1026.
66. See id. at 1029-32 (recounting legislative efforts to pass a coastal bill in 1970-1972).
67. Id. at 1033.
68. See generally id. at 1019.
69. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 2700 1(d) (1972) repealedby Coastal Act of 1976.
70. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 27001(b) (1972) repealedby Coastal Act of 1976.
71. CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 27320(c) (1972) repealed by Coastal Act of 1976.
72. SB 1277 (Smith, D-Saratoga) (1976). The competing bills AB 3875 (Keene) and AB
3402 (Cullen) were respectively characterized as a "bulldozer in sheep's clothing" and a
"bulldozer without even the sheep's clothing." Press release from the Planning and Conservation League (July 26, 1976) (on file with author).
73. See, e.g., SB 1277 30001 (a) ("That the California coastal zone is a distinct and valuable natural resource belonging to all the people and exists as a delicately balanced ccosystem"); See California Coastal Plan (1975) at 19 (explaining that property rights are not abso-
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Revetments, breakwaters, groins, harbor channels, seawalls, cliff retaining
walls, and other such construction that alters natural shoreline processes
shall be permitted only when designed to eliminate or mitigate adverse
impacts on shoreline sand systems and when required (1) to maintain public recreation areas or to serve necessary public service... where there is
no less environmentally harmful alternative, or (2) to protect principal
structures of existing development that are in danger from present erosion
where the coastal agency determines that the public interest would be better served by protecting
8 the existing structures than in protecting the natural shoreline process.
Policy 19 is instructive in that it is clearly codified in Coastal Act section 30235. 71 Policy 19 demonstrates that the authors of the Plan were aware
of the problems associated with shoreline protection, that protecting private
property may be in conflict with the public interest, and that shoreline protection should only be granted if it was in the public's interest even if the
structure already existed prior to the Act! Thus, according to the Coastal
Commissioners in 1975, the Coastal Act would grant shoreline protection
only if (1) adverse effects were mitigated, (2) it protected an existing structure, and (3) it was in the public's interest.
However, assuming that the Commission was unclear with regard to the
definition of "existing" within Policy 19, other sections of the Coastal Plan
leave little doubt that shoreline protection was not appropriate for development subsequent to the enactment of the Coastal Act. For example, Policy
67, Geologic Safety Review and Regulationfor New Development, states:
All proposed structures for human occupancy in [an area] of high geologic
hazard shall be reviewed and regulated to avoid risk to life and property:
(a) areas of high geologic hazard include seismic hazard areas. ... unstable bluff and cliff areas, beaches subject to erosion, and others;
(g)replacement structures in locations where previous structures have been
rendered unfit for human occupancy by geologic instability shall only be
permitted if they can successfully withstand the same instability.w
Policy 68, Prevent Public Subsidy for HazardousDevelopments, states:
It is recommended that State legislation be enacted that if for any reason
new structures are built in high geologic areas ... there shall be no public
78. 1&
79. Coastal Act § 30235:

[s]eawalls... and other such construction that alters natural shoreline processes
shall be permitted when required to serve coastal-dependent uses or to protect existing structures or public beaches in danger from erosion, and when designed to
eliminate or mitigate adverse impacts on local shoreline sand supply.
Id.

80. California Coastal Plan at 87-88 (codified as Coastal Act § 30211).
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assistance for such construction or reconstruction and no presumption of
public liability for property loss.8'
Policy 70, Regulate Bluff and Cliff Developments for Geologic Safety,

states:
Bluff and cliff developments shall be permitted if design and setbacks are
adequate to assure stability and structural integrity for the expected economic lifespan of the development and if the development will neither
create nor contribute significantly to erosional problems or geologic instability ... bluff protection works may be permitted only in accordance with
policy 19. With that exception, no new lot shall be created or new structure built that would increase the need for bluff protection works.8"
Policy 70, which is codified as Coastal Act section 30253, has a very
important characteristic: it refers back to policy 19 (codified as section
30235). This demonstrates the Legislature's intent that Coastal Act sections
30235 and 30253 be interpreted together. The practical consequence for
coastal landowners is that if they violate the setback requirement under
Coastal Act section 30253, they should not be able to argue that they deserve
protection under Coastal Act section 30235 (seawalls for existing structures).83
Finally, there is also substantial evidence in the Coastal Plan, in addition
to the specific policy recommendations, that the Commissioners understood
the coastal processes, the costs to the public, and the solutions. ' For example, the plan explicitly states that sand replenishment was very expensive." It
is clear that the Commissioners understood the private property rights issues
and instead chose to protect public rights.86 There is little doubt that the authors of the Coastal Plan never intended to permit seawalls for development
built after the Coastal Act.

81. Id. at 88.
82. Id. at 89.

83. See Coastal Act § 30007.5 (2001) ("[C]onflicts [within the Coastal Act are tol be resolved in a manner which on balance is the most protective of significant coastal resources.").
84. See, e.g., California Coastal Plan. "Bluff Protective works are costly and involve
problems ... these measure can be extremely costly, may be unsightly in the cases of retaining walls, may interfere with access along the shore, may require continual sources of sand
for replenishment ... a decrease in sand supply ... when artificial protective measures interfere with natural bluff erosion process." Id. at 89.
85. See id. at 44 (noting that replenishing Doheny State Beach cost over $1 million).
86. See, e.g., Policy 19 (protection of private property would only be allowed when tie
Commission holds that protecting the existing structure is in the public interest).
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D. Direct Legislative History Argues Against a Liberal Construction of
"Existing "
The legislative evolution of the bill that was enacted as the Coastal Act,
SB 1277, provides strong evidence that the insertion of "existing" into section 30235 was a distinct policy choice made by the legislature in 1976."
Early versions of SB 1277 stated in section 30204 (later renumbered section
30235), "Revetments, breakwaters, groins... seawalls, cliff retaining walls
and other such construction that alters the natural shoreline process shall be
permitted when required to serve coastal-dependent uses or to protect structures, developments, beaches, or cliffs in danger from erosion ....
The early version of SB 1277 did not include the word "existing" before
"structure" and would have allowed any structure or even "developments,
beaches or cliffs in danger from erosion" to have a seawall. However, this
was quickly modified in committee. The next version struck the phrase "developments, and cliffs in danger from erosion" from the bill and on January
19, 1976, in what became the final version of section 30235, the word "existing" was inserted before "structures."
To further emphasize the importance of the addition of "existing," the
competing bills, which were considered the "developer friendly" Coastal Act
bills," did not add the word "existing" before "structure" and included the
protection of cliffs as a legitimate reason to permit seawalls. For example,
AB 3875 section 30007 reads, "[S]eawalls... shall be permitted when required to serve coastal-related uses or to protect structures, developments,
beaches or cliffs in danger from erosion.. ." Obviously, the competing
coastal act bills could have resulted in the complete armoring of almost the
entire California coast and would have entitled any structure in danger from
erosion a seawall.
However, SB 1277 was enacted9 ' and, therefore, was the intent of the
legislature. The Smith-Beilenson bill (SB 1277) inserted the word "existing" into the Coastal Act in committee, because it intended to distinguish between structures built after 1976 and those structures built before 1976 that
warranted protection. To interpret the language otherwise would give effect
to versions of coastal act bills that were not enacted.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

S.B. 1277 (Ca. 1976).
S.B. 1277 (Ca. 1975).
See Press Release of the Planning and Conservation League. supra note 72.
A.B. 3875 § 30007 (Ca. 1975).
Coastal Act § 30000 et seq. (2001).
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E. Textual Analysis Requires that "Existing" be Interpretedas a
GrandfatherClause.
As already stated, Coastal Act section 30235 is currently interpreted by
the Coastal Commission as mandating shoreline armoring when a structure
is in danger from erosion, regardless of when the structure was built. While
this may seem to be a reasonable interpretation, close textual analysis indicates that the current interpretation does not conform to the intent of the
Legislature when writing the Coastal Act.
Coastal Act section 30235 states:
Revetments, breakwaters, groins, harbor channels, seawalls, cliff retaining
walls, and other such construction that alters natural shoreline processes
shall be permitted when required to serve coastal-dependent uses or to

protect existing structures or public beaches in danger from erosion, and
when designed to eliminate or mitigate adverse impacts on local shoreline
sand supply. Existing marine structures causing water stagnation contributing to pollution problems
and fish kills should be phased out or upgraded where feasible. 2

It is standard in statutory construction that every word is important and
is given effect. 3 One could possibly argue that the words "existing structures" were intended to distinguish between protecting empty lots from lots
having structures already on them. Such interpretation, however, would not
necessitate adding "existing" before "structures." The statute without the
modifying adjective "existing" would have this meaning. In other words, the
word "structures" precludes protecting future structures, without requiring
the word "existing." Taking the prior argument to the extreme, a structure
would deserve protection moments after completion; as soon as there were
four walls, a roof, and dry paint. Furthermore, the every-completedstructure-is-"existing" interpretation would bring Coastal Act section 30235
into conflict with Coastal Act section 30253.
Coastal Act section 30253(2) states: "[New development shall] neither
create nor contribute significantly to erosion... or in any way require the
construction of protective devices that would substantially alter natural landforms along bluffs and cliffs."'4 If the interpretation requires protection of
structures regardless of when they were built, the setback requirements of
Coastal Act section 30253 are meaningless. Coastal landowners would be
encouraged to ignore setback requirements, because they were guaranteed a
seawall as soon as their "existing" structure was in danger from erosion.

92. Coastal Act § 30235 (2001) (emphasis added).
93. NORMAN J.
(5th ed. 1992).

SINGER,

2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRucrION

§ 46.06, at 119-20

94. Coastal Act § 30235(2) (2001).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol38/iss1/7

14

Cardiff: Conflict in the California Coastal Act: Sand and Seawalls

2001]

CONFLICT IN THE CALIFORNIA COASTAL ACT

This cannot have been the intention of the drafters of the Coastal Act.
The setback requirement for new development is mandatory and unambiguous: "New development shall [not] require the construction of protective devices."95 The only way to keep section 30235 consistent with section 30253
is to distinguish "new development" from "existing." In other words, new
development (after 1976) shall not be allowed a seawall; existing development (prior 1976) shall be permitted to have a seawall when in danger from
erosion.
Furthermore, Coastal Act section 30007.5 requires "conflicts [within the
Coastal Act] be resolved in a manner which on balance is the most protective of significant coastal resources." Coastal Act sections 30235 and
30253 were intended to be interpreted together." But even if they were not
part of the same subset of policies, Coastal Act section 30007.5 requires that
they be interpreted in a manner most protective of the coastal resource. The
only way to bring them out of conflict is to interpret "existing structures" as
those structures already existing at the time of the Coastal Act.
Finally, "existing" is used twice in section 30235; once before "structures" and once later in the statute: "[S]eawalls... shall be permitted when
required ... to protect existing structures... . Existing marine structures
causing water stagnation contributing to pollution problems and fishkills
should be phased out or upgraded where feasible."' Statutory construction
demands, at the very least, consistency within a section." It seems clear the
legislature was intending to phase out marine structures presently existing at
the time of the passage of the Coastal Act. Any other interpretation would be
absurd. Thus, in order to interpret the word "existing" consistently within
section 30235, necessitates a grandfather clause interpretation of "existing."
The intentional placement of "existing" as a modifying adjective before
"structures" must mean existing before 1976 (passage of the Coastal Act).
Any other statutory construction would simply not require the word.
In summary, there are three reasons why any textual analysis must come
to the conclusion that "existing" must be interpreted as existing at the time
of the Coastal Act. First, the alternative interpretation of "existing" would
not necessitate the inclusion of the word "existing" in the statute. Second,
the alternative interpretation would be inconsistent with other sections of the
Coastal Act. Finally, the alternative interpretation would create an inconsistency within Coastal Act section 30235.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Coastal Act § 30253 (2001) (emphasis added).
Coastal Act § 30007.5 (2001).
See interplay between Coastal Plan policy 19 and policy 70, supra pp. 264-66.
Coastal Act § 30235 (2001) (emphasis added).
See SINGER, supra note 93, § 46.06, at 120.
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IV. CASELAW

Coastal homeowners often believe that they have a Constitutional property right to protect their property from erosion by building a seawall."° Any
change in current Coastal Act policy with regard to shoreline armoring, or a
Coastal Commission decision denying a seawall to a particular property
owner, will be challenged as an unconstitutional legislative taking. The preeminent case for legislative takings is Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,'' where the U. S. Supreme Court held that "[compensation is required] where the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all
economically beneficial use."'" Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, went
on to warn, "[A]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership."'' 3 Thus, any regulation that
deprives a landowner of all economically beneficial use of his property, and
is not based in a State's background property laws, requires compensation in
order to be considered Constitutional.
California has not litigated whether denying a landowner permission to
build a seawall amounts to a legislative taking, but indirect case law would
seem to indicate that a seawall ban would not be considered a taking. Furthermore, courts in other states have directly held that there is no Constitutional right to build shoreline armoring.t

North Carolina, in Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson,' dealt
directly with whether a ban on the construction of a "permanent hardened
erosion control structure" was Constitutional."° In Shell Island, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals ruled that North Carolina's "hardened structure
rule," 7 which denied permanent shoreline armoring for a hotel, did not
100. See, e.g., Whalers Village Club v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 252
(1985) (noting that the respondent believes they have a "[Constitutional] right to protect one's
home from destruction"). On a personal note, at the many Coastal Commission hearings I
have attended, I have yet to meet a coastal homeowner who did not declare they have a Constitutional right to a seawall.
101. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of the United States Supreme Court
Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme Court Really Matter?. 6
FORDHAM ENvTL. L.J. 523, 543 (1995) (calling Lucas "the much-heralded [takings] case").

Lucas has been discussed or cited in 2525 cases (citation history as of July 5. 2001. in
WESTLAW, KC citations).
102. 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992).
103. Id. at 1029.
104. See, e.g., Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson, 134 N.C. App. 217 (1999),
Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131 (1993).
105. Facts at Shell Island Homeowners Ass'n v. Tomlinson, 124 N.C. App. 286 (1999).
106. Shell Island, 134 N.C. App. at 220. Plaintiffs argued "[tlhe protection of property
from erosion is an essential right of property owners." Id. at 228.
107. 15A NCAC 7H.0308(a)(1)(B).
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amount to a regulatory taking, inverse condemnation, and was not a violation of equal protection or due process.' 0 The court noted:
[P]laintiffs have failed to cite to this Court any persuasive authority for the
proposition that a littoral or riparian landowner has a right to erect hardened structures in statutorily designated areas of environmental concern to
protect their property from erosion and migration ... [tihe owner of the
riparian land thus loses title to such portions as are so worn or washed
away or encroached upon by the water.
Its title was divested by "the
sledge hammering seas, the inscrutable tides of God."'"
The court further explained that the "hardened structure rule" was not
denial of due process or equal protection, because the right to build a seawall
is not a fundamental right under the Constitution, and the hardened structure
rule is "clearly rationally related to the legitimate government end.""' Finally, almost as a side-note regarding Lucas, the court found that the regulations were in place when the hotel (the original structure) was permitted, and
therefore there was no compensable taking by reason of the regulations.'"
Oregon took a different tact in defending the Oregon Beach Bill. OAR
736-20-010(6) states, "[P]ermit applications for beachfront protective structures seaward of the beach zone line (the dry sand vegetation line), will be
considered only where development existed on January 1, 1977. The proposed project will be evaluated against the applicable criteria included
within [the beach bill]."" 2
The Oregon Beach Bill's restriction of seawalls was challenged in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach."' The plaintiff, relying on Lucas, claimed that
the denial of a seawall amounted to a legislative taking because the "ordinance deprive[d] them of all economically viable use of their property.""'
The interesting part of Stevens is not simply the fact that the Court rejected
the plaintiff's arguments, concluding that there was not a legislative taking,
but how the Court reached its conclusion.
In Oregon, the public has a common law and statutory right to use the
dry sand area of the beach." 5 The Court explained:
Permanent erosion control structures may cause significant adverse impacts on the
value and enjoyment of adjacent properties or public access to and use of the ocean
beach, and, therefore, are prohibited. Such structures include, but are not limited
to: bulkheads; seawalls; revetments; jetties; groins and breakwaters.
As cited in Shell Island, 134 N.C. App. at 219.
108. Shell Island, 134 N.C. App. at 231-33.
109. Id. at 228 (citations omitted).
110. d at 233.
111. Id. at231.
112. Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131. 145 (1993).
113. Id. at 146.
114. Id. at 147.
115. See id at 138 (quoting Thornton v. Hay. 254 Or. 584 (1969)).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2001

17

California Western Law Review, Vol. 38 [2001], No. 1, Art. 7
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38

When plaintiffs took title to their land, they were on notice that exclusive
use of the dry sand areas was not part of the "bundle of rights" that they
acquired, because public use of dry sand areas "is so notorious that notice
of the custom on the part of persons buying land along the shore must be
presumed."',16

The Oregon Supreme Court, applying language from Lucas, held that
compensation was not required because the "plaintiffs have never had the
property interests that they claim were taken by [the regulation]." ' 7 Thus, the

Oregon Supreme Court held, even under the strict standards of Lucas, that a
ban on seawalls did not amount to a legislative taking of property under the
U.S. Constitution.
Although there have not been any cases in California that directly deal
with the denial of a seawall,"s case law seems to indicate that there is no
Constitutional right to a seawall." 9 For example, in Whaler's Village Club v.
2 the Court of Appeals stated, "a fundamental right to
Cal. Coastal Comm'n,"'
protect one's property under the [California] Constitution (CAL. CONST., art.

1 sec. 1)"' is not the equivalent of a vested right to protect property in a particular manner where the method chosen is one that is regulated by government." ' The Court went on to point out, "It is now a fundamental axiom in
the law that one may not do with his property as he pleases; his use is subject
to reasonable restraints to avoid societal detriment....,,

3

116. Stevens, 317 Or. at 143 (citations omitted).
117. Id. Stevens relied heavily on Lucas, which held:
Where the state seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically
beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent
inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that the proscribed use interests
were not part of his title to begin with.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027.
118. California courts have generally battled over whether the Coastal Commission
could enforce conditions, such as mitigation or dedications of easements, in exchange for a
seawall. See Whaler's Village Club v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240, 261
(1985) (holding that because seawalls were likely to exacerbate erosion of the public beach, a
dedication of an easement was an appropriate condition). Contra Surfside Colony v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1260 (1991) (holding that there was not a sufficient nexus
between the private community's revetment and erosion to the public beach to justify a public
access easement).
119. See Barrie v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 196 Cal. App. 3d 8 (1987).
120. Whaler's Village, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 240.
121. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § I ("Inalienable rights: All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty.
acquiring, possessing, and protectingproperty, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
and privacy.") (emphasis added).
122. Whaler's Village, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 252-53. See also Barrie, 196 Cal. App. 3d at
18 (holding that there is no vested right in an emergency seawall and upholding Whaler's Village).
123. Whaler's Village, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 253 (citing People v. Byers, 90 Cal. App. 3d
140, 147-48 (1979); HFH, Ltd. v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. 3d 508, 515 (1975)).
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In Scott v. City of Del Mar, the City declared that shoreline armoring
encroaching upon the public's land was a nuisance per se.'2" The plaintiff refused to remove their encroachments and sought to recover under inverse
condemnation when the City forcibly removed the plaintiffs seawall and
patio.'" The Court of Appeals denied relief to the plaintiff and upheld the
City's right to legislatively declare seawalls nuisances per se, stating, "Del
Mar's abatement of the encroachments [seawalls] on public land was a reasonable exercise of its' '26police power, which does not give rise to an inverse
condemnation action.

1

Unfortunately, in California, the right to build shoreline armoring has
not been litigated. Most of the cases have questioned whether the Coastal
Commission properly imposed conditions when permitting a seawall.' In
Barrie v. Cal. Coastal Comn'n, the issue was whether the Coastal Commission could compel a homeowner to relocate their seawall that had been built
under an emergency permit." Although, the court noted in Barrie: "An individual has no vested right to protect property in a particular manner where
the method chosen is one that is regulated by [the] government,"'' the court
was not determining whether there was a general right to build a seawall, but
only whether there was a vested right to a seawall in the specific location allowed by an emergency permit.'" The court held that homeowners do not
have a 3vested right to a seawall at a location allowed under an emergency

permit.1 '

Similarly, in Whaler's Village Club v. Cal. Coastal Comm 'n, the court

held that there was not a Constitutional right to own property free from regulation, and was simply determining whether the conditions placed on the
permit for the seawall were reasonable.' The court stated, "The original
building permits for construction of residences did not give respondent a
preexisting fight to unregulated new construction. Moreover, the [Coastal]

124. 58 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1305 (1997). The city declared the encroachments nuisances
per se because the seawalls increased erosion and they blocked public access. Id. at 1306.
125. Id. at 1301.
126. Id. at 1307. The court also held that diminution in value for removing the seawalls
did not amount to a compensable taking. Id.
127. See Surfside Colony v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1260, 1260 (1991)
(holding that there was an insufficient nexus between the city's revetment and erosion to the
public beach to justify a public access easement). Cf. Whaler's Village, 173 Cal. App. 3d at
261 (holding that because seawalls were likely to exacerbate erosion of the public beach, a
dedication of an easement was an appropriate condition).
128. Barrie v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 196 Cal. App. 3d 8. 8 (1987).
129. Id. at 15 (quoting Whaler's Village).
130. The seawall encroached fifteen feet onto public land. Barrie. 196 Cal. App. 3d at
13.
131. Id. at 18.
132. Whaler's Village, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 253-54.
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Commission did not deny them the right to construct a revetment. The question is only the reasonableness of the conditions attached."'33
Thus, the right to protect one's home with a revetment or a seawall has
not been decided in California. One could reasonably argue that, according
to Whaler's Village, there is a right to protect one's home from erosion under the California Constitution,' but that right is qualified by regulations on
how, when, and where the shoreline armoring will be built. 3' But other language in Whaler's Village appears to contradict this line of reasoning: "Respondent's 'right' to construct a new such revetment in a coastal area, an
area of public trust, is not a right 'already possessed' or 'legitimately required.' Respondent's use of its property must be subject to 'reasonable restraints to avoid society detriment,"' ' . which would seem to preclude damaging the public's property by building a seawall.
Furthermore, it is clear from Scott v. City of Del Mar that seawalls and
revetments may be declared a nuisance per se."' However, in Scott the seawalls and revetments were encroaching upon public land.'38 Does legislative
power to declare seawalls a nuisance per se extend to seawalls and revetments completely on private land?'39 The Supreme Court has upheld ordinances against private land use on the basis of a public nuisance."'
It is likely that a policy relying on both the public trust doctrine and nuisance principles to ban seawalls would pass Constitutional muster. The legislative history of the Coastal Act indicates that the legislature was concerned with the considerable adverse impacts of shoreline armoring when
Coastal Act section 30235 was being formulated."' Furthermore, as demonstrated by the review of cases above, both within California and in other
states, protecting one's home with shoreline armoring is not a fundamental,
Constitutional right. Finally, the simple fact that other states ban seawalls"'
should indicate that California would have little Constitutional difficulty in

133. Id.

134. CAL. CONST. art 1, § 1.
135. Whaler's Village, 173 Cal. App. 3d at 253-54.

136. Id. at 253 (citations omitted).
137. 58 Cal. App. 4th at 1305-06.
138. Id. at 1306.
139. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992) (warning
that "a noxious-use justification [for regulation] cannot be the basis for departing from our
categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated").
140. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibiting brickyard in
Los Angeles because of noxious fumes); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (prohibiting mining operation that was interfering with water supply).
141. See California Coastal Plan 89 (1975).
142. Tina Bernd-Cohen & Melissa Gordon, STATE COASTAL MANAGEMEN r
tN PROTECTING BEACHES, DUNES. BLUFFS, ROCKY SHORES: A NATIONAL.
OVERVIEW (1998) (Oregon. South Carolina, North Carolina and Maine ban shoreline armoring).

EFFECTIVENESS
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either correctly interpreting the Coastal Act or amending the Coastal Act to
ban seawalls.
V. OPTIONS

There are three ways to change the current status quo and prevent the
continued wallification of the California coast. The first option is to change
the language in the Coastal Act through the legislature. The second option
would be for the California Coastal Commission to interpret the Coastal Act
as suggested above. The third option is to bring litigation against the Coastal
Commission, mandating a correct interpretation of the Coastal Act.
Legislative repair of the Coastal Act would require the substitution of a
single word. Changing Coastal Act section 30235 to read, "Seawalls MAY be
permitted," instead of "SHALL be permitted," would give the Coastal Commission discretion in determining whether to permit specific homeowners a
seawall. It would be up to the Coastal Commission to determine the merits
of the specific seawall application.
A tough discretionary seawall policy would encourage better options
such as removal or modification of the structure, better erosion resistant
landscaping, and more sensible setbacks. However, it will always be difficult
to deny specific homeowners protection in the form of a seawall when they
are threatened with the loss of their homes.
Another possible legislative fix would be to simply define "existing."
"Existing" could be defined as anything that was built before the passage of
the Coastal Act, which would have much the same effect as I have suggested
with the reinterpretation. "Existing" could also be defined as anything built
before some specific date. Even if "existing" was given a date set after the
passage of the Coastal Act, at the very least, there would be some areas
spared from the adverse impacts of future seawalls. This option would not
help Southern California, which is, at present, extensively developed.
A legislative solution is fraught with pitfalls. First of all, the beach erosion issue is not as clear-cut as it is in some states on the East Coast. The
majority of sand on the East Coast is derived from lateral sand transport systems and the large continental shelf."3 On the West Coast, rivers and streams
deliver the majority of the sand.'" Furthermore, there have been some studies suggesting that Pacific storms have become more powerful and now
track farther south than in previous decades, which by implication is exacer-

143. DEAN, supra note 1, at 22.
144. Griggs et al., supra note 21, at 14.
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bating erosion. 5 Finally, on the East Coast, hurricanes periodically destroy
large sections of coastal development.' 6
On the West Coast, although large storms do land, they do not have the
same force as hurricanes' 7 Coastal destruction from large storms is localized and the dangers of building on the coast seem much more manageable
(e.g. the possibility of building a seawall to protect a home).'48 Thus, the majority of people in California, who do not live directly on the coast, seem
oblivious to the folly of building on the coast and the public costs of shoreline armoring. It will be difficult to gain broad public support to ban seawalls.
Another danger to opening up the Coastal Act to amendment through
legislative action is the power of the coastal development interests. Coastal
developers and property-rights groups, such as the Pacific Legal Foundation,
already have been seeking to weaken the Coastal Act through amendment
and the courts.' 9 AB 2310 (D-Ducheny) is a prime example of the power of
the development interests. 5 ' AB 2310, as originally drafted, would have denied the Coastal Commission jurisdiction to review wetlands development
that had an approved Habitat Conservation Plan."' Habitat Conservation
Plans would have become a back door to development inconsistent with the
Coastal Act. Although AB 2310 was eventually weakened before adoption,
it demonstrates the danger of amending the Coastal Act in the face of wellfunded and well-connected opposition.
Any amendment that denied protection for coastal landowners would be
challenged as an unconstitutional legislative taking. Although the Constitutional challenges may eventually fail, the amendment would be held up indefinitely in court pending challenge. One possible way to avoid Constitutional problems would be to include a compensation clause. However, this
would also be fraught with difficulty.'52 What is the worth of a coastal prop145. David E. Graham, Making Bigger Waves: Stronger Storms Raise Risk for S.1)
Coastline, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Feb. 4, 2001, at B I (citing a study by UCSD's Scripps
Institute of Oceanography that waves are larger and more destructive than in the past).
146. See generally DEAN, supra note 1, at 134-54 (recounting damage from numerous
hurricanes on the Eastern and Gulf Coasts).
147. Griggs et al., supra note 21, at 23.
148. See generally id. at 24 (discussing climate change and the mild climate from 1946
to 1976).
149. See, e.g., Marine Forests Society v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, No. 00AS00567 (Sacramento Sup. Ct., filed Jan. 31, 2000) (appeal filed May 8, 2001); Terry Rodgers, Coastal l'anel
Ruled Unconstitutional: Judge Finds Board Oversteps Authority, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUttNI.

Apr. 27, 2001, at A3.
150. See Seema Meeta, New Wetlands Bill Would Check Bolsa Chica Ruling, L.A,

TimEs, Feb. 25, 2000, at B14.
151. Terry Rodgers, Coastal Control is the Subject of Revived Bill, SAN DIE(;o UNION-

TRIBUNE, May 16, 2000, at A3.
152. See Gary Griggs & Lauret Savoy, Shoreline Protection and Engineering, in LiVING

WITH THE CALIFORNIA COAST 46, 74 (Gary Griggs & Lauret Savoy eds.. 1985) (noting some
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erty in danger from erosion? Many coastal lots have extremely large homes
worth millions of dollars: would compensation include the fair market value
of the home without erosion problems? Ultimately, a compensation scheme
may be unworkably expensive and would drain State resources because of
lawsuits aimed at increasing the amount of compensation a coastal landowner received from condemnation proceedings."
Finally, finding a State representative to carry a bill is difficult and dangerous for the political career of anyone who undertakes this daunting
proposition.' The coastal landowners' mantra, "save our homes," clearly
carries huge emotional and political appeal.' 5 The coastal landowner has the
advantage of a simplistic argument that is difficult to counter even for officials who have a deep understanding of the issue.'" In addition, coastal landowners are wealthy and politically savvy, whereas the general public has little understanding of the issues or the costs involved.
On the other side, beach advocates have a complicated, esoteric argument which does not boil down easily into a slogan. The damage caused by
shoreline armoring takes longer to explain and includes a number of side issues that seem to support the coastal landowners' perspective. For example,
dams, flood-control works, sand mining, and development in general reduce
the sand supply before the sand reaches the coastline. '" The damage caused
by shoreline armoring is gradual in many cases and is not obvious to the
casual observer.' 8 However, without shoreline armoring, even a sand-starved
beach will maintain a recreational beach, because the shoreline will erode.
It requires a deep understanding of the issues to understand why shoreline
armoring costs more, in the long run, than the worth of the property threatened by erosion."W Thus, in my opinion, a legislative fix is clearly unworkable and doomed to failure.
of the problems with condemnation or acquisition programs).
153. But see idU Griggs notes the limited resources of state and local governments, but
ultimately concludes "condemnation may well become an increasingly common control technique." I disagree for the reasons stated above.
154. The Surfrider Foundation has approached a number of coastal state representatives
but has not been successful in finding an "author" to carry an anti-seawall bill.
155. At the Coastal Commission hearing on March 13, 2001. a hearing that included
three seawall permits, coastal landowners arrived with large buttons exclaiming "Save our
Homes."
156. Coastal Commissioner Dettloff commented, "I do not think we (the Coastal Commission) have the guts to tell someone their house is going to fall into the Ocean (and deny a
seawall]" (comments during the Coastal Commission hearing March 13, 2001).
157. See Stone, supra note 25, at 708. Seawalls, however greatly exacerbate erosion on a
sand-starved beach. Terchunian, supra note 29, at 68.
158. See Pilkey & Wright, supra note 18, at 44 ("[Sjeawall impact on beaches is often a
long-term phenomenon").
159. Terchunian, supra note 29, at 67-68.
160. DEAN, supra note 1, at 16 (citing a report by Orrin H. Pilkey and James D. Howard
which was submitted to President Reagan in 1982).
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The second option is for the Coastal Commission to reinterpret the
Coastal Act. Interpreting "existing" as only allowing protection to those
structures built before the Coastal Act, although the correct interpretation,
would require an incredible act of bravery on the part of the Coastal Commission. It will always be difficult to deny a homeowner protection when
their property is clearly in danger.'61 Furthermore, the controversy over "existing" will continue. For example, does the small beach house that existed at
the time of the Coastal Act deserve protection as an "existing structure" after
it has been "remodeled" into a mansion? How much of the original structure
must be remodeled before a structure is considered "new development"?
One option, which seems to be the current policy of the Coastal Commission, is to require deed restrictions in return for a development permit on
a coastal bluff. Common deed restrictions include an admission of the danger of building in a geologically hazardous zone, a release of liability for the
Coastal Commission and a promise not to build shoreline protection in the
future, in return for a coastal development permit. 2 As of this date, the
Coastal Commission has not enforced deed restrictions denying shoreline
armoring."'
One purpose of deed restrictions is to counter the lack-of-knowledge argument. Although knowledge, or lack thereof, of the true consequences of
unwise coastal development is not an element for consideration in a shoreline armoring permit, showing intentional or negligent disregard for coastal
hazards may be crucial in the fight to deny shoreline armoring. In other
words, knowledge and intent legally have no significance, but may be the
critical element in providing courage to the Coastal Commission in denying
shoreline armoring.
Presently, the coastal landowner provides a sympathetic image to the
Coastal Commission by claiming that bluff erosion conditions were unknown at the time of development (i.e., did not violate Coastal Act section
30253 setback provisions). For example, in a recent case in Solana Beach,
six property owners claimed that new information, a clean sand lens tinknown at the time of building, created the need for immediate shoreline protection.' " Likewise, in the Cliff's Hotel appeal in Pismo Beach, the Hotel
claimed that undiscovered natural springs increased erosion (presumably to
counter the accusation that the green, cliff-top lawn was exacerbating erosion).'65 Deed restrictions address this concern by providing constructive
161. See id. at 68.
162. See, e.g., Coastal Commission Staff Report CDP 6-99-103 (noting that sonic of the
properties included deed restrictions specifically denying the ability to build shoreline armoring).
163. Cf Ojavan Investors v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 26 Cal. App. 4th 516. 527 (1997)
(upholding deed restrictions for transfer development credits).
164. CDP 6-99-103.
165. See Staff Report, A-3-PSB-98-049 (Cliff's Hotel Appeal).
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knowledge to the coastal landowner that they are taking the risk and encouraging proper setback.
Another way to show constructive knowledge for those properties that
do not include deed restrictions would be to investigate other legal instruments for those properties that have been significantly remodeled and sold.
California law requires disclosure of geologic conditions upon sale of the
house.'" These documents, while not having a legal bearing regarding shoreline armoring, will have an enormous effect on the sympathy factor for the
homeowner. The Coastal Commission, if it accepts the "grandfather clause"
interpretation of section 30235, may be less likely to use their discretion to
grant a permit when they believe a homeowner intentionally, or negligently,
built too close to the bluff edge.
The final option is activist litigation against the Coastal Commission. In
essence, coastal advocates must ask the judiciary to correctly interpret section 30235 and order the Coastal Commission to follow the "new" interpretation. Thus, changing the interpretation of the Coastal Act would require the
Coastal Commission to continue to approve permits for shoreline armoring
and coastal activists bringing suit against the Coastal Commission seeking a
writ of mandamus. 7 This would require certain conditions to correctly target
the interpretation of "existing" under the section 30235.'"
First, the structure would need to be in imminent danger from erosion.
There has been no case law that challenges the need for the structure to be in
danger from erosion, and the Coastal Commission appears to routinely deny
permits for structures not in danger from erosion.'" A successful case decided on this aspect of section 30235 would have virtually no impact on the
current practices, because most homeowners who request a seawall are
clearly in danger from erosion. However, the structure should not be in immediate harm sufficient to qualify for an emergency permit.
Second, the property would ideally not include deed restrictions. Although deed restrictions are desirable if the Coastal Commission wishes to
deny seawall applications, they essentially are a waiver of one's rights under
the Coastal Act.' Furthermore, deed restrictions have been upheld in the
coastal zone.' A successful suit upholding deed restrictions would not have
an impact on current shoreline development practices.
A best-case scenario for bringing a lawsuit would be a case where the
issue was focused solely on whether the structure could be considered existing. Thus, the facts of the case would ideally include: a primary structure
166. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1102.6 (2001).

167. This concept was formulated through discussions with Doug Ardlcy, Esq. (Surfer's
Environmental Alliance) and Mark Massara, Esq. (Coastal Director of the Sierra Club).

168. A victory or loss on other issues would not have a policy-changing effect.
169. See, e.g., Defendant's Brief at 4, Cliff's Hotel v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, CV 080283.
170. Ojavan Investors v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 26 Cal. App. 4th 516, 527 (1997).

171. Id.
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built after 1976, clearly in danger from erosion; no previous shoreline armoring; a design that adequately mitigates adverse impacts; and approval from
the Coastal Commission.
This would be the preferable course of action for a number of reasons.
First, there is a reasonable possibility that the court will rule that "existing"
does in fact indicate an intent to protect only structures built before 1976 and
that the Coastal Commission is violating the Coastal Act by approving
shoreline armoring for any other structures.
If the court found otherwise, it would not change the current approval
practices of the California Coastal Commission. In other words, an adverse
ruling only preserves the status quo, although admittedly it would not allow
the Coastal Commission to reinterpret the Coastal Act on its own. However,
an adverse ruling that "existing" means any primary structure existing at the
time of being in danger of erosion would not preclude a legislative fix.
I believe that those who argue that the courts are not an appropriate
venue to change the interpretation of section 30235 have not adequately assessed the dangers of a legislative fix, the political climate, or the relatively
low risk of litigation on this matter. A worst-case scenario of litigation
would expend the time, effort and monetary resources of coastal advocates,
but would not preclude other options.
There are other benefits as well. For example, if the Coastal Commission does deny a permit based on the fact that the structure was built after
1976, the Coastal Commission will be defending its interpretation of "existing" from wealthy landowners and private property rights groups. Coastal
advocates will not be able to control who the defense attorney will be, nor
how passionately the Coastal Commission will defend.' Although coastal
advocates will be able to intervene as a defendant, there will be less control
regarding the narrow issues presented. If the coastal advocate is the plaintiff,
the issue going up for review can be intentionally kept narrow and the quality of the lawyer can be controlled.
VI. CONCLUSION

Seawalls protect private property at the expense of the public beach.
The purpose of this Comment was two-fold. First, I intended to inform the
casual reader about the physical problems associated with seawalls and the
current legal considerations regarding shoreline armoring. Second, I intended to provide tools to practitioners, policy makers, and decision-makers
who wish to begin charting a course that fully protects the public's beach.
The right to shoreline armoring is a highly contentious issue. Local and
state officials often feel compelled to permit seawalls regardless of the ad172. Ordinarily, the Attorney General defends the Coastal Commission. Sam Overton.
Esq., Dan Olivas, Esq., and Jamee Jordan Patterson, Esq. (Deputy Attorneys General covering
Central and Southern California) have competently defended the Coastal Commission.
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verse impacts. I have heard on multiple occasions Coastal Commissioners
lamenting that the law requires them to permit yet another seawall, and in
certain circumstances the Commissioner is correct. However, for new development, built after 1976, there is no requirement to permit a seawall under
the Coastal Act.
Other states have enacted complete bans on seawalls that have survived
constitutional challenges." California case law, although not directly on
point, seems to indicate that there is no constitutional right to build a seawall.'" Therefore any reinterpretation or amendment to section 30235 would
likely also survive a legal challenge.
The Coastal Commission is finding it increasingly difficult to find the
middle ground. It is impossible to ignore the fact that 150 miles of seawalls
is, at the very least, having a disastrous cumulative impact on the availability
of the recreational beach. Yet, the emotional appeals of homeowners are also
impossible to ignore. Ultimately, compromise is not possible.' As Orrin H.
Pilkey and Kathrine Dixon remind us: "you can have houses or you can have
beaches; you cannot have both.." 6

173. See generally Shell Island Homeowners Assoc. v. Tomlinson. 134 N.C. App. 217
(1999); Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 317 Or. 131 (1993).
174. See Whaler's Village Club v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 173 Cal. App. 3d 240 (1985);
Barrie v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 196 Cal. App. 3d 8 (1987); Scott v. City of Del Mar, 58 Cal.
App. 4th 1269 (1997).
175. PuxEy & DIXON, supra note 5, at 53.
176. Id.
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